NOTE: This article is a condensed version of
my much longer article entitled “The Southern Side
of the Civil War: Facts Your History Teacher May Not Have Mentioned About the
War Between the States.”
A
CONDENSED LOOK AT THE SOUTHERN SIDE OF THE CIVIL WAR
Michael
T. Griffith
2004
@All
Rights Reserved
When I began to study the Civil War, I
realized that much of what I had been taught about it in school was either
wrong or incomplete. It has been said that history is written by the victors.
This is especially true when it comes to the Civil War. The Southern side of
the story is rarely presented fairly in our public schools and textbooks
today. I believe it is important that
we as Americans know the whole truth about the Civil War. The purpose of this
article is to present the South’s side of the story.
The following basic facts are undisputed:
The seven states of the Deep South seceded in response to the victory of the
Republican Party’s presidential candidate, Abraham Lincoln, in the 1860
election. These states formed the
Confederate States of America. Lincoln
refused to recognize the Confederacy. A
small federal garrison occupied Fort Sumter, South Carolina, on December 26,
1860. The Confederate government
attempted to negotiate the withdrawal of the garrison from the fort. Lincoln decided not to evacuate the
garrison. Confederate forces attacked
Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861. Lincoln
issued a call-up for 75,000 troops to put down what he claimed was a rebellion
in the South. Four more Southern states
joined the Confederacy. Lincoln sent
federal armies into the South. The war
lasted approximately four years and ended in April 1865.
The version of the Civil War that’s taught
in nearly all textbooks goes something like this: “The only reason the South
wanted to leave the Union was to protect slavery. The South had no right to secede. The South started the war by firing on Fort Sumter. The war was fought over slavery. The defeat of the South was a victory for
government ‘of the people, by the people, and for the people.’” This is the version of the war that I
accepted for most of my life.
We will consider twelve issues relating to
the Civil War: Why Did the South Secede?
Did the South Have the Right to Secede?
What Caused the War? Who Started
the War? The Emancipation Proclamation.
Republicans, the North, and Racism. Was
the War Fought Over Slavery? What
Happened at Andersonville Prison? Did
the South Control the Federal Government Until 1860? The Reconstruction Era.
The True Nature of the War. And,
What If the South Had Been Allowed to Go in Peace?
Why Did the South Secede?
Nearly all textbooks give the impression
that the South withdrew from the Union merely to protect the institution of
slavery. This is a misleading, overly
simplistic characterization. Slavery
was not the only factor that led the South to secede. In fact, some of the wealthiest slaveholders opposed
secession. They believed, for good
reason, that slavery would actually be safer in the Union than out of it. Historian William Klingaman notes that even
Lincoln argued that the South would have a harder time protecting slavery
outside the Union:
But secession,
Lincoln argued, would actually make it harder for the South to preserve
slavery. If the Southern states tried to leave the Union, they would lose all
their constitutional guarantees. . . . (Abraham Lincoln and the Road to
Emancipation, New York: Viking Press, 2001, p. 32)
Most people aren’t aware that, even as
president, Lincoln supported a proposed constitutional amendment that would
have guaranteed slavery’s continuation forever. Lincoln mentioned his support for this
amendment in his first inaugural address.
In the years leading up to the Civil War, Lincoln acknowledged that
slavery was protected by the Constitution.
He also supported the Fugitive Slave Law. Therefore, some Southern statesmen didn’t believe Lincoln was
going to threaten slavery’s existence.
Yet, they supported secession anyway.
Most Southern leaders who advocated
secession in order to protect slavery did so because they believed that Lincoln
and the Republicans in Congress would try to abolish slavery by
unconstitutional means and that Southern slaveholders would not receive compensation
for their slaves. Southern spokesmen
felt this would be unfair, since Northern slaveholders had been able to receive
various types of compensation for their slaves when most Northern states had
abolished slavery several decades earlier.
They knew that emancipation without compensation would do great damage
to the Southern economy. Critics note
that many Southern statesmen voiced the view that slavery was a “positive
good.” Yet, even the “positive good”
advocates acknowledged that slavery had its evils and abuses. In any case, there were plenty of
Southerners who opposed slavery and who were willing to see it abolished in a
fair, gradual manner, as had been done in most Northern states. After all, 69-75 percent of Southern
families did not own slaves.
However, few Southerners believed the Republicans were interested in a
fair, gradual emancipation program. The
more extreme Republicans, who were known as “Radical Republicans,” certainly
weren’t interested in such a program.
Few people today understand why the South
distrusted the Republican Party. Not
only was the Republican Party a new party, it was also the first purely
regional (or sectional) party in the country’s history. Republican leaders frequently gave
inflammatory anti-Southern speeches, some of which included egregious
falsehoods and even threats (Susan-Mary
Grant, North Over South: Northern Nationalism and American Identity in the
Antebellum Era, University of Kansas Press, 2000). Historian William C. Cooper points out that
the Republicans “had no interest in cultivating support in the South, which
they branded as basically un-American,” and that “No major party had ever
before so completely repudiated the South” (Jefferson Davis, American, Vintage
Books Edition, New York: Vintage Books, 2000, pp. 294, 295). British historian Susan-Mary Grant notes
that the Republican Party that came into being in 1854 was “a sectional party
with a sectional ideology . . . that was predicated on opposition to the South,
to the economic, social, and political reality of that section” (North Over
South, p. 17). Southerners were
alarmed when dozens of Republican congressmen endorsed an advertisement for
Hinton Helper’s book The Impending Crisis of the South, which spoke
approvingly of a potential slave revolt that would kill untold numbers of
Southern citizens in a “barbarous massacre.”
The Republican Party even distributed an abridged edition of the book as
a campaign document, and Republican editors added captions like “The Stupid
Masses of the South” and “Revolution . . . Violently If We Must.” Southerners also noticed that the
Republicans broke the long-established tradition of having a sectionally
balanced presidential ticket. For
decades, all major political parties had nominated tickets that consisted of
one candidate from the North and one from the South. Each of the three other parties in the 1860 election followed
this tradition, but not the Republican Party.
Another reason that Southerners were worried about the Republicans was
that the party’s leaders made it clear they would push for several policies
that the South believed were harmful and unconstitutional. Many Southerners feared that Republican
leaders were determined to subjugate and exploit the South by any means. With these facts in mind, perhaps it’s not
hard to understand why the election of Lincoln triggered the secession of seven
Southern states.
As mentioned, slavery was not the only
factor that led to secession. If one reads
the Declarations of Causes of Secession and the Ordinances of Secession that
were issued by the first seven states of the Confederacy, one finds that there
were several reasons these states wanted to be independent and that some of the
reasons had nothing to do with slavery.
For example, the Georgia and Texas Declarations of Causes of Secession
included economic complaints, in addition to concerns relating to slavery. The Texas declaration complained that unfair
federal legislation was enriching the North at the expense of the Southern
states. The Georgia declaration complained about federal protectionism and
subsidies for Northern business interests.
The South’s long-standing opposition to the
federal tariff was another factor that led to secession. The South’s concern over the tariff was
nothing new. South Carolina and the
federal government nearly went to war over the tariff in 1832-1833. In the session of Congress before Lincoln’s
inauguration, the House of Representatives passed a huge increase in the
tariff, over the loud objections of Southern congressmen. Naturally, this alarmed Southern statesmen
at all levels, since the South was always hit hardest by the tariff. One only has to read the many speeches that
Southern senators and representatives gave against the 1860-1861 tariff
increase to see how seriously they took this issue. Moreover, in the congressional debates from the previous four
decades, one can find dozens of Southern speeches against the tariff. Opposition to the tariff led some Southern
leaders to talk of secession over thirty years before the Civil War occurred
(Walter Brian Cisco, Taking A Stand: Portraits from the Southern Secession
Movement, Shippensburg, Pennsylvania: White Mane Books, 2000, pp.
1-44). Scholars who argue that Southern
statesmen didn’t really care about the tariff and that this was merely a “smoke
screen” are ignoring a massive body of historical evidence.
The South had valid complaints about the
tariff. Jeffrey R. Hummel, a professor
of economics and history, notes the negative impact of the tariff on the
Southern states and concedes that Southern complaints about the tariff were
justified:
Despite
a steady decline in import duties, tariffs fell disproportionately on
Southerners, reducing their income from cotton production by at least 10
percent just before the Civil War. . . .
At least with
respect to the tariff’s adverse impact, Southerners were not only absolutely
correct but displayed a sophisticated understanding of economics. . . . The tariff was inefficient; it not only
redistributed wealth from farmers and planters to manufacturers and laborers
but overall made the country poorer. (Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free
Men: A History of the American Civil War, Chicago: Open Court, 1996, pp.
39-40, 73)
A major point of contention between the
North and the South was the issue of the size and power of the federal
government as defined by the Constitution.
Most Northern politicians supported a loose reading of the Constitution
and wanted to expand the size and scope of the federal government, even if that
meant giving the government powers that were not authorized by the
Constitution. Most Southern statesmen
supported a strict reading of the Constitution and believed the federal
government should perform only those functions that were expressly delegated to
it by the Constitution. From the
earliest days of the republic, Southern and Northern leaders battled over this
issue. Our textbooks rarely do justice
to this important fact.
Four of the eleven Southern states did not
join in the first wave of secession and did not secede over slavery. Those four states—Arkansas, North Carolina,
Tennessee, and Virginia—only seceded months later when Lincoln made it clear he
was going to launch an invasion in order to “save” the Union. In fact, those states initially voted against
secession by fairly sizable majorities.
However, they believed the Union should not be maintained by force. Therefore, when Lincoln announced he was
calling up 75,000 troops to form an invasion force, they held new votes, and in
each case the vote was strongly in favor of secession. Thus, four of the eleven states that
comprised the Confederacy seceded because of their objection to federal coercion
and not because of slavery.
Virtually no history textbooks mention the
fact that each Confederate state retained the right to abolish slavery within
its borders, and that the Confederate Constitution permitted the admission of
free states into the Confederacy. In
his analysis of the Confederate Constitution, historian Forrest McDonald says
the following:
All states reserved
the right to abolish slavery in their domains, and new states could be admitted
without slavery if two-thirds of the existing states agreed—the idea being that
the tier of free states bordering the Ohio River might in time wish to join the
Confederacy. (States’ Rights and the Union, University of Kansas Press,
2000, p. 204)
Did the South Have the Right to Secede?
I believe the evidence is clear that the
South had the right to secede. None
other than Ulysses S. Grant, the commanding general of the Union army for much
of the Civil War and later a president of the United States, admitted he
believed that if any of the original thirteen states had wanted to secede in
the early days of the Union, it was unlikely the other states would have
challenged that state’s right to do so.
Grant also conceded he believed the founding fathers would have
sanctioned the right of secession rather than see a war “between
brothers.” Said Grant,
If
there had been a desire on the part of any single State to withdraw from the
compact at any time while the number of States was limited to the original
thirteen, I do not suppose there would have been any to contest the right, no
matter how much the determination might have been regretted. . . .
If
they [the founding fathers] had foreseen it, the probabilities are they would
have sanctioned the right of a State or States to withdraw rather than that
there should be war between brothers. (The Personal Memoirs Of Ulysses S.
Grant, Old Saybrook, Connecticut: Konecky & Konecky, 1992, reprint of
original edition, pp. 130-131)
There is nothing in the
Constitution that prohibits a state from peacefully and democratically
separating from the Union. Indeed, the
right of secession is implied in the Tenth Amendment, which reads,
The
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.
The Constitution does not
give the federal government the power to force a state to remain in the Union
against its will. President James
Buchanan acknowledged this fact in a message to Congress shortly before Lincoln
assumed office. Nor does the
Constitution prohibit the citizens of a state from voting to repeal their
state’s ratification of the Constitution.
Therefore, by a plain reading of the Tenth Amendment, a state has the
legal right to peacefully withdraw from the Union.
Critics of the Confederacy
cite certain clauses in the Constitution about the supremacy of federal law or
about states not being allowed to enter into treaties with foreign powers,
etc., etc. However, it goes without
saying that such clauses only apply to states that are in the Union. There’s simply nothing in the Constitution
that says a state can’t peacefully and democratically revoke its
ratification. If a state’s citizens
were to vote in a legitimate democratic process to revoke the state’s
ratification of the Constitution, either by direct vote or by convention, then
that state would no longer be bound by the Constitution. The citizens of each state are the ultimate
sovereign, not the federal government.
The federal government is supposed to be servant of the people, not
their master. Even Lloyd Paul Stryker,
who opposed secession, admitted the Southern states had an “arguable claim that
no specific section of the Constitution stood in their way,” i.e., no section
of the Constitution prohibited peaceful, democratic separation (Andrew
Johnson: A Study in Courage, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1930, p.
447).
The great early American
constitutional scholar William Rawle said a state had the right to secede. Rawle was a contemporary of founding fathers
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison and was appointed by George Washington as
the first U.S. Attorney for Pennsylvania.
Rawle’s book A View of the Constitution of the United States was
used as a legal textbook at a number of universities, including West Point,
Dartmouth, and Harvard. To this day,
scholars who debate legal issues relating to the First and Second Amendments
refer to Rawle’s work. On the issue of
secession, Rawle said,
It
depends on the state itself to retain or abolish the principle of
representation, because it depends on itself whether it will continue a member
of the Union. To deny this right would be inconsistent with the principle on
which all our political systems are founded, which is, that the people have in
all cases, a right to determine how they will be governed.
This
right must be considered as an ingredient in the original composition of the
general government, which, though not expressed, was mutually understood. . . .
(A View of the Constitution of the United States, 2nd Edition, 1829,
Vol. 4, p. 571)
Another early American legal
giant, George Tucker, also said a state had the right to secede. Like Rawle, Tucker was a contemporary of
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison and corresponded with the former. Tucker came to be known as the “American Blackstone.”
Tucker was a professor of law at the University of William and
Mary. He served as the chief justice of
the Virginia supreme court and was appointed as a federal district court judge
by James Madison. Tucker’s 1803 edition
of Blackstone’s Commentaries, which he annotated to American law, was
widely used for the teaching of law in the United States for years. On the issue of secession, Tucker wrote that
the states’ participation in the Union was voluntary and that each state had
the right to resume to “the most unlimited extent” the functions that it had
delegated to the federal government:
The
federal government, then, appears to be the organ through which the united
republics communicate with foreign nations and with each other. Their submission to its operation is
voluntary: its councils, its engagements, its authority are theirs, modified,
and united. Its sovereignty is an
emanation from theirs, not a flame by which they have been consumed, nor a
vortex in which they are swallowed up.
Each is still a perfect state, still sovereign, still independent, and
still capable, should the situation require, to resume the exercise of its
functions as such in the most unlimited extent. (Tucker, editor, Blackstone’s
Commentaries: With Notes of Reference to the Constitution and Laws of the
Federal Government of the United States, Volume 1, Philadelphia: William
Birch and Abraham Small, 1803, Appendix: Note D, Section 3:IV)
The Union was never meant to
be held together by force. The Southern
states joined the Union voluntarily, and they should have been able to leave it
voluntarily. A key principle of
Americanism is the sacred right of self-government, that government should only
govern “with the consent of the governed.”
This noble idea is expressed in the Declaration of Independence. America
came into existence by secession from England.
There was only a war because England wouldn’t allow the American
colonies to leave in peace. George Washington’s
secretary of state, Timothy Pickering of Massachusetts, rightly said that
America was founded on the principle of secession. Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Declaration of Independence
and the third president of the United States, said in a letter to William
Crawford in 1816 that if a state wanted to leave the Union, he would not
hesitate to say “Let us separate,” even if he didn’t agree with the reasons the
state wanted to leave.
The principle of peaceful
separation was as American as apple pie.
But Lincoln, relying on an utterly erroneous understanding of the
founding of the Union, declared that secession was “treason,” “insurrection,”
and “rebellion.” If Lincoln had been
alive during the Revolutionary War and had used the same kind of reasoning that
he used against Southern secession, he would have sided with the British.
The South had no desire to
overthrow the federal government. The
South seceded in a peaceful, democratic manner, with the support of the
overwhelming majority of Southern citizens.
The Southern states used the same process to secede that the original
thirteen states used to ratify the U.S. Constitution, i.e., by voting in
special conventions comprised of delegates who were elected by the people. The one exception was Tennessee, which,
instead of holding a convention, passed a secession resolution in the state
legislature and then held a referendum in which secession won by a margin of
more than two to one. Furthermore, most
Southerners believed secession would be peaceful. In fact, it’s revealing that the early correspondence of the
first Confederate secretary of war, Leroy Walker, "clearly indicates he
did not expect war" (Rembert Patrick, Jefferson Davis and His Cabinet,
Louisiana State University Press, 1944, p. 106).
What Caused the War?
The war was fought because Lincoln refused to
allow the South to go in peace. Other
Republican leaders and certain Northern business interests played key roles in
the decision to use force, but ultimately Lincoln was the one who had to make
the decision, and he chose to launch an invasion. The fighting and dying started when federal armies invaded the
South. That’s why nearly all the
battles were fought in the Southern states.
The Confederacy did not want war. One of the first things Jefferson Davis did
after assuming office as president of the Confederacy was to send a peace
delegation to Washington, D.C., in an effort to establish friendly ties with
the federal government (Cooper, Jefferson Davis, American, pp. 360-362;
Kenneth Davis, Don’t Know Much About the Civil War, New York:
HarperCollins Publishers, 1996, pp. 156-157). The Confederacy offered to pay
the South’s share of the national debt and to pay compensation for all federal
installations in the Southern states (Charles Roland, The Confederacy,
University of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 28; Patrick, Jefferson Davis and His
Cabinet, p. 77; William C. Davis, Look Away! A History of the
Confederate States of America, New York: The Free Press, 2002, p. 87). The Confederacy also announced that Northern
ships would continue to enjoy free navigation of the Mississippi River (Hummel,
Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men, p. 138; Davis, The Rise and
Fall of the Confederate Government, Volume 1, pp. 210-213). Yet, Lincoln rejected all Confederate peace
offers and insisted that federal armies would invade if the Southern states
didn’t renounce their independence and recognize federal authority.
It should be pointed out that many Northern
citizens opposed the war and believed the South should be allowed to leave in
peace. Dozens of Northern newspapers
expressed the view that the Southern states had the right to peacefully leave
the Union and that it would be wrong to use force to compel them to stay. Even President James Buchanan told Congress
in an official message shortly before Lincoln assumed office that the federal
government had no right to use force against the seceded states.
Who Started the War?
The standard textbook answer to this
question is that the South obviously started the war because it “fired the
first shot” by attacking Fort Sumter, which was located in the harbor of
Charleston, South Carolina. Most
textbooks don’t mention several facts that put the attack in proper
perspective. For example, after the
Fort Sumter incident, the Confederacy continued to express its desire for peaceful
relations with the North. Not a single
federal soldier was killed in the attack.
The Confederates allowed the federal troops at the fort to return to the
North in peace after they surrendered.
South Carolina and then the Confederacy offered to pay compensation for
the fort. Lincoln later admitted he
deliberately provoked the attack so he could use it as justification for an
invasion. The Confederates only
attacked the fort after they learned that Lincoln had sent an armed naval
convoy to resupply the federal garrison at the fort. The sending of the convoy violated the repeated promises of
Lincoln’s secretary of state, William Seward, that the fort would be
evacuated. Seward continued to promise
the Confederacy that the fort would be evacuated even after he knew that
Lincoln had decided to send the convoy.
Major John Anderson, the Union officer who commanded the federal
garrison at the fort, opposed the sending of the convoy, because he felt it
would violate the assurances that the fort would be evacuated, because he knew
it would be viewed as a hostile act, and because he did not want war. Several weeks before the Fort Sumter
incident, Lincoln virtually declared war on the South in his inaugural address,
even though he knew the Confederacy wanted peaceful relations.
In his inaugural speech, given weeks before
the attack on Fort Sumter, Lincoln threatened to invade the seceded states if
they didn’t continue to pay federal “duties and imposts” (the tariff) and/or if
they didn’t allow the federal government to occupy and maintain all federal
installations within their borders.
Imagine what the American colonists would have thought if the British
had said to them, “We want peace. But,
we’re going to invade you if you don’t keep paying our tariff and/or if you
don’t allow us to occupy and maintain all British installations within your
borders.” The colonists would have
rightly regarded this as a virtual declaration of war. Of course, in effect, the British did say
this to the colonies. This was the same
position that Lincoln presented to the Confederate states weeks before the Fort
Sumter attack. Furthermore, five months
earlier, some Republicans in Congress publicly swore “by everything in the
heavens above and the earth beneath” that they would convert the seceded states
“into a wilderness” (James McPherson, The Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil
War Era, New York: Ballantine Books, 1988, p. 251).
If Lincoln had desired peace, he knew all he
had to do was evacuate Fort Sumter, as his own secretary of state had been
promising would be done for weeks. When
the Confederate authorities were told the fort was going to be evacuated,
Confederate forces stopped building up the defenses around the harbor and
celebrated. Across the harbor, Major
Anderson was grateful the fort would be evacuated and that therefore North and
South would separate peacefully (Cisco, Taking A Stand, pp. 105-106).
But, sadly, Lincoln didn’t pursue peace with
the Confederacy. For a while it seemed
as though he was prepared to evacuate Fort Sumter, in spite of his earlier
statements to the contrary. Initially
all but two of his cabinet members urged evacuation, as did his
general-in-chief, General Winfield Scott.
However, Radical Republicans and influential Northern business interests
applied intense pressure on Lincoln and on his cabinet not to evacuate the
fort. Radicals in the Senate threatened
impeachment if the fort were evacuated (Catton and Catton, Two Roads to
Sumter, p. 277). Once the low
Confederate tariff was announced, powerful Northern business interests came out
strongly opposed to peace with the Confederacy. As the pressure for aggression mounted, Lincoln decided to
provoke an attack on the fort in order to use the attack as a pretext for
invasion and to whip up a majority of the Northern public into a war frenzy
against the South. Lincoln himself
later admitted in two letters that he provoked the attack so he could use it as
justification for waging war (Francis Butler Simkins, A History of the South,
Third Edition, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963, pp. 213, 215-216; J. G. Randall
and David Donald, The Civil War and Reconstruction, Lexington,
Massachusetts: D. C. Heath and Company, 1969, p. 174).
Some Northern leaders who wanted peace urged
that Fort Sumter be evacuated. Among
those leaders was General-In-Chief Winfield Scott and Senator Stephen Douglas,
one of the most prominent Northern members of the U.S. Senate. Scott and Douglas both recognized that the
continued federal occupation of Fort Sumter was a virtual declaration of war
against the Confederacy. Any country on
earth would strongly resent the unwanted occupation of an island in one of its
major harbors.
Republicans protested loudly over the fact
that several Southern states seized numerous federal installations before
Lincoln assumed office and in a few cases before the state had voted to
secede. Modern critics tend to make a
mountain out of a molehill over this issue, as if those seizures alone
justified a brutal invasion. Nearly all
the seizures occurred after the state had already seceded, so in those cases
the state arguably had every right to assume control of federal facilities
within its borders. Most of the
relatively few pre-secession seizures took place when there was no doubt the
state was going to secede. In one case,
local citizens seized a federal installation on their own initiative. When the governor learned of the seizure, he
ordered the citizens to leave the facility.
Not one of the seizures involved the loss of life. A number of the federal facilities that were
seized were of little consequence and were manned only by small garrisons. Admittedly, the pre-secession seizures,
though few in number, were unwise and arguably illegal. However, let’s keep in mind that these
seizures posed no threat to the federal government, that they were bloodless,
and that the Confederacy offered to pay compensation for all federal
installations in the South. The
seizures certainly didn’t provide any credible justification for a federal
invasion, and they were hardly what one could call “aggression” in any
meaningful sense of the word.
The Emancipation Proclamation
Everyone can agree that slavery needed to be
abolished. However, the Emancipation
Proclamation, signed on January 1, 1863, left over 400,000 slaves in
bondage. Let’s take a moment to
consider the purpose, nature, and legality of the Emancipation Proclamation.
The proclamation was a war measure, as the
document itself states. The Radical
Republicans hoped the proclamation would produce a slave revolt in the South,
even if this resulted in the deaths of thousands of women and children on
plantations and farms. (Perhaps it’s an
indication of how most slaves were treated that no such revolt ever occurred,
even though many plantations and farms were being run by women and children at
the time, since most of the men were engaged in the war effort.)
The proclamation did not free a single slave
in any of the four Union slave states nor in any of the regions of the South
that were then under Union control. The
proclamation excluded the slaves in those areas. The proclamation only applied to slaves in the Confederate
states, where Lincoln had no authority to enforce it. Slavery continued in the Northern slave states and in the South
for the rest of the war and wasn’t abolished until the Thirteenth Amendment was
ratified in late 1865. Historians John
Blum and Bruce Catton commented on the limited nature of the proclamation:
The Emancipation
Proclamation asserted freedom for slaves in those areas that were not under
control of the federal government and left slavery untouched in areas where
federal control was effective. It
seemed a halting measure of dubious effect and shaky legality, and the
Confederates denounced it as a call for a slave revolt. (In Blum and Catton,
Edmund Morgan, Arthur Schlesinger, Kenneth Stampp, and C. Vann Woodward,
editors, The National Experience: A History of the United States, Second
Edition, New York: Harcourt, Brace, & World, 1968, p. 360)
African-American scholar Lerone Bennett
documents that Lincoln only issued the proclamation under intense pressure from
the Radical Republicans, who were threatening to cut off funds to the army if
emancipation wasn’t made a war objective, and that Lincoln only began to
seriously consider the Radicals’ demands after Union forces suffered several
defeats (Bennett, Forced Into Glory: Abraham Lincoln’s White Dream,
Chicago: Johnson Publishing Company, 2000, pp. 23-24, 415-420, 498-504; see
also Klingaman, Abraham Lincoln and the Road to Emancipation, pp. 139,
148-149, 200-202). Bennett also shows
that Lincoln sought to undermine the proclamation almost as soon as he issued
it.
The proclamation provided no compensation
for slaveholders, even though Lincoln himself had said this should be done, and
even though most slaveholders treated their slaves humanely (as even many
abolitionists had once been willing to admit).
Few Northern abolitionists had ever supported compensated
emancipation. The Radical Republicans
certainly weren’t about to support such a plan. They didn’t care that several Northern states had reaped
fantastic profits from the slave trade.
Nor did they care that when most Northern states had abolished slavery
they had done so gradually and in a manner that enabled Northern slaveholders
to recover the cost of their slaves.
If the Southern states were still actually
in the Union, as Lincoln and other Republicans incredibly claimed, then the
Emancipation Proclamation was unconstitutional. Neither Lincoln nor Congress had the right to abolish slavery in
any state. The only legal ways to
abolish it would have been by a constitutional amendment or by the states
abolishing it on their own.
Of course, the Southern states had in fact
left the Union, and everyone knew it.
Lincoln only denied this fact because he knew the federal government had
no constitutional right to invade states that had peacefully and democratically
separated from the Union. Since the
Southern states were no longer part of the federal compact, the Emancipation
Proclamation amounted to an attempt to incite a slave revolt in another
country, in spite of the proclamation’s disclaimer to the contrary. Certainly the Radicals hoped the
proclamation would spark a slave revolt, regardless of the cost in human
lives. American leaders reacted angrily
when the British tried to incite a slave revolt in the American colonies during
the Revolutionary War. This was a serious
threat, since slaves were held in each of the thirteen colonies at the time. The British offered freedom to American
slaves who would fight in the British army, and they encouraged slaves to
sabotage the colonial war effort. Not
surprisingly, tens of thousands of slaves flocked to British army
encampments. Fortunately, however, not
enough slaves fought for the British to turn the tide against the
colonies. At the end of the war, at
least 18,000 former slaves accompanied British troops as they evacuated New
York, Charleston, Savannah, and other cities (Hummel, Emancipating Slaves,
Enslaving Free Men, p. 10).
If the Emancipation Proclamation had covered
all slaves, if it had included compensation for slaveholders, and if it had
contained guarantees against a slave revolt, it would have been on solid moral
ground. It still would have been
unconstitutional, but it would have been consistent, fair, and moral. However, the proclamation contained none of
these things. It was intended as a war
measure. It left Northern slaves in
bondage. Its real purpose was to
advance the effort to subjugate the South, even if that meant causing the
deaths of thousands of women and children.
The Radicals and other Republicans were using Southern slaves as pawns
in their effort to conquer the South.
Republicans, the North, and Racism
(NOTE: In this section it will be necessary
to quote some offensive words and statements from the Civil War era. I apologize to those readers who are
offended by them.)
The same Republican-controlled Congress that
eventually made forceful emancipation a secondary goal of the war and that
imposed oppressive Reconstruction rule on the South after the war, also
sanctioned the federal government’s terrible mistreatment of the American
Indians. Historian C. Vann Woodward put
it this way:
The same Congress
that devised Radical Reconstruction . . . approved strict segregation and
inequality for the Indian of the West. (In Blum and Catton et al, editors, The
National Experience, p. 416)
With the Republicans firmly in control of
the federal government, the Union army began a series of brutal campaigns
against the American Indians a few months after the Confederate commanding
general, Robert E. Lee, surrendered at Appomattox, Virginia. Federal forces and Northern militias cheated
and abused the Indians on certain occasions during the war, but the federal
campaigns against the Indians that started with the Sioux War in 1865 were
vicious and remain a stain on our history.
Under Republican rule, the federal government ordered forced relocations,
engaged in shameful treaty violations, and authorized merciless attacks in
which thousands of Indians, including many women and children, were
killed. Generals William Tecumseh
Sherman and Phil Sheridan, fresh from having ravaged the South, were responsible
for many of those attacks. The general
who ordered the first post-war campaign against the Indians was Ulysses S.
Grant. Much of the worst mistreatment
of the Indians occurred when Grant was president (1868-1876). Republicans occupied the White House for all
but seven of the thirty-one years from 1861 to 1892 (three of those seven years
were under Lincoln’s vice president, Andrew Johnson, and the remaining four
years didn’t come until 1884-1888). The
Republicans controlled Congress for the majority of that period as well,
especially from 1861 to 1874.
I agree with Thomas DiLorenzo’s point that
the Republicans’ treatment of the Indians raises questions about their
professed concern for social justice:
The fact that the
war against the Plains Indians began just three months after Lee’s surrender
calls into question yet again the notion that racial injustices in the South
were the primary motivation for Northerners’ willingness to wage such a long
and destructive war. No political party
purporting to be sensitive to racial injustice could possibly have even
contemplated doing to the Indians what the United States government did to
them.
Both the Southern
Confederates and the Indians stood in the way of the Whig/Republican dream of a
North American economic empire, complete with a subsidized transcontinental
railroad, a nationalized banking system, and protectionist tariffs. Consequently, both groups were conquered and
subjugated by the most violent means. (The Real Lincoln: A New Look at
Abraham Lincoln, His Agenda, and an Unnecessary War, Paperback Edition, New
York: Three Rivers Press, 2003, pp. 222-223)
Another example of Republican hypocrisy was
the Republican Party’s platform for the 1868 presidential election. Ulysses S. Grant ran for president on this
platform, and won handily. The platform
stated that the Southern states should be forced to allow blacks to vote but
that the Northern states should be allowed to decide this issue for
themselves. The Republicans took this
position even though every Northern state that had voted on amendments for
black voting rights in the preceding three years had soundly defeated those
amendments. Republican leaders knew
that racism was so widespread in the North that they would lose the election if
they advocated forcing the Northern states to allow blacks to vote. Many Republicans themselves weren’t
enthusiastic about voting rights for Northern blacks anyway.
Many Republican leaders, including some of
the Radicals, held racist views.
Thaddeus Stevens, the leader of the Radicals in the House, not only
opposed racial integration but believed blacks were less intelligent than
whites and, in the words of friendly biographer Fawn Brodie, “insisted that he
had never held to the doctrine of Negro equality” (Fawn Brodie, Thaddeus
Stevens: Scourge of the South, New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1959,
p. 193; Hummel, Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men, p. 300). Incidentally, Stevens also believed the
Constitution was “a worthless bit of old parchment” (Brodie, Thaddeus
Stevens, p. 292). Another powerful
Radical in the House, George Julian, lectured his fellow Republicans about
their racism, saying, “The real trouble is that we hate the negro. It is not his ignorance that offends us, but
his color. . . .” (Kenneth Stampp, The Era of Reconstruction, 1865-1877,
Vintage Books Edition, New York: Vintage Books, 1965, p. 102). Benjamin Wade, a leading Radical in the
Senate, was overheard “railing about too many 'nigger' cooks in the capital”
and complaining that he had eaten so many meals “cooked by Niggers” that he
could “smell and taste the Nigger all over” (Klingaman, Abraham Lincoln and
the Road to Emancipation, p. 53).
In the 1860 election campaign, numerous Republican leaders championed
their party as the true “White Man’s Party” that would keep the western
territories safe for white labor (McPherson, Ordeal By Fire: The Civil War
and Reconstruction, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1982, p. 123). Lincoln’s secretary of state, William
Seward, the man who claimed in 1858 that there was an “irrepressible conflict”
between the free states and the slaveholding states, spoke for many Republicans
when he said,
The North has
nothing to do with the Negroes. I have
no more concern for them than I have for the Hottentots. . . . They are not of
our race. (In Klingaman, Abraham Lincoln and the Road to Emancipation,
p. 295)
Lincoln himself held racist views. As a politician in Illinois, Lincoln voted
to deny blacks the right to vote, and he supported the state’s oppressive
“Black Code.” Lincoln used the N-word,
even in public statements, and even as president. Lincoln referred to the Declaration of Independence as “the white
man’s charter of freedom.” He also said
he did not support allowing blacks to be citizens, explaining, “I am not in
favor of negro citizenship” (The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln,
Volume 3, edited by Roy Basler, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 1952-1955, p.
179). In an 1858 speech, Lincoln left
no doubt about his views on race:
I will say, then,
that I am not nor ever have been in favor of bringing about in any way, the
social and political equality of the white and black races; that I am not nor
ever have been in favor of making voters of the free negroes, or jurors, or
qualifying them to hold office, or having them to marry white people. I will
say in addition, that there is a physical difference between the white and
black races, which, I suppose, will forever forbid the two races living
together upon terms of social and political equality, and inasmuch as they
cannot so live, that while they do remain together, there must be the position
of superior and inferior, that I as much as any other man am in favor of the
superior position being assigned to the white man. (Abraham Lincoln:
Speeches and Writings 1832-1858, New York: The Library of America, 1989,
edited by Don Fehrenbacher, p. 751)
To be fair, it should be noted that Lincoln
was by no means alone in his views. The
sad truth is that in those days the vast majority of white Americans, in all
parts of the country, shared Lincoln’s racial attitudes. Most whites believed that the white race was
the superior race and that therefore blacks and other minorities belonged to
inferior races. Nearly all textbooks
give the false impression that white supremacy and racism were mainly confined
to the South, but these problems were widespread in the North as well. Numerous historians have acknowledged this
fact. In many cases, the “free” states
weren’t very free for blacks. Historian
Robert Cruden:
To understand
something of the nature of that problem we must look at the position of the
American Negro in the 1860s. . . .
Throughout the nation there were 488,000 free Negroes. . . . Most free Negroes—258,000—lived in the
South. . . .
“Free people of
color” were welcome in few places. In
the North they were almost universally segregated, excluded from public life,
and their children barred from white public schools. In those areas where separate Negro schools were provided they
were inadequately financed and instruction was poor. . . .
The situation of
the black American when the war ended was ambiguous. . . . Northerners as a whole, willing to concede
freedom, were hostile to equality. Many
of them dreaded an incursion of black folk after the war—especially among lower
paid workers who feared Negro competition and some not so poorly paid who
resented possible Negro entry into their crafts. The use of Negroes as strikebreakers during the war and their
employment in areas where whites were out of work resulted in agitation and
riots and intensified anti-Negro feeling.
Such sentiment,
however, was by no means confined to workingmen. Between 1865 and 1867 voters in Connecticut, Wisconsin, and Ohio
rejected proposals for Negro suffrage [the right to vote]; in 1868 only 8 out
of 16 Northern states permitted Negroes to vote. Oregon even continued its pre-war prohibition against the entry
of free Negroes. . . . (The Negro in Reconstruction, New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1969, pp. 6, 12-13)
African-American scholars John Franklin and
Alfred Moss:
There can be no
doubt that many blacks were sorely mistreated in the North and West. Observers
like Fanny Kemble and Frederick L. Olmsted mentioned incidents in their
writings. Kemble said of Northern blacks, “They are not slaves indeed, but they
are pariahs, debarred from every fellowship save with their own despised race.
. . . All hands are extended to thrust them out, all fingers point at their
dusky skin, all tongues . . . have learned to turn the very name of their race
into an insult and a reproach.” Olmsted
seems to have believed the Louisiana black who told him that they could
associate with whites more freely in the South than in the North and that he
preferred to live in the South because he was less likely to be insulted there.
(From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans, New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 2000, p. 185)
Was the War Fought Over Slavery?
The war was fought over Southern
independence, not over slavery. Lincoln
said repeatedly the war was not being fought over slavery. In August 1862, over a year after the war
started, Lincoln wrote an open letter to a prominent Republican abolitionist,
Horace Greeley, in which he said he did not agree with those who would only
“save” the Union if they could destroy slavery at the same time. Lincoln added that if he could “save” the
Union without freeing a single slave, he would do so (Letter to Horace Greeley,
August 22, 1862, published in the New York Tribune).
In July 1861, after the First Battle of
Manassas (Bull Run) had been fought, the U.S. Congress passed a resolution, by
an overwhelming majority, that declared the war was not being fought to disturb
slavery, nor to subjugate the South, but only to “maintain the Union” (i.e., to
force the Southern states back into the Union). A few months later, in September, a group of Radicals visited
Lincoln to urge him to make compulsory emancipation a war objective. Lincoln declined, telling the Radicals, “We
didn’t go into the war to put down slavery, but to put the flag back” (Brodie, Thaddeus
Stevens, p. 155; Klingaman, Abraham Lincoln and the Road to Emancipation,
pp. 75-76). Later on, about halfway
through the war, the Radicals and other Republicans succeeded in making the
uncompensated abolition of Southern slavery a secondary goal of the
war. However, the primary purpose of
the federal invasion was always to destroy Southern independence.
The war itself really had nothing directly
to do with slavery. It’s true that
issues involving slavery were the most important factors behind the first wave of
secession, but secession and the war were two separate events, and four of the
Southern states did not secede over slavery.
As noted earlier, secession was a peaceful, democratic process. The seceded states posed no threat to the
federal government, and they had no intention of trying to overthrow the
government. The Confederate states
wanted to live in peace with the North and offered to pay their share of the
national debt and to pay compensation for all federal forts in the South.
If the Southern states had not seceded,
there would have been no war and slavery would have continued. If the Southern states had surrendered when
Lincoln issued his call-up for an invasion force, there would have been no war
and slavery would have continued. If
Jefferson Davis’s first announcement as Confederate president had been that the
Confederacy was going to abolish slavery, Lincoln and the Radicals still would
have invaded the South. If the
Confederacy had informed Lincoln at any point during the war that it was going
to start an emancipation program, Lincoln would not have suddenly called off
the federal invasion. The issue was
Southern independence, not slavery.
The reaction of the Northern abolitionists
to the proposal of fellow abolitionist Moncure Conway is further proof the war
was not fought over slavery. At least a
few of the abolitionists were Republicans, and nearly all of them strongly
supported the Radicals. Conway, on the
other hand, was a pacifist. Yet, at
first Conway reluctantly supported the invasion of the South. “But,” notes Jeffrey Hummel, “the increasing
bloodshed sickened him.” So, when
Conway was in England in 1863, he proposed to a Confederate envoy that if the
South freed the slaves the abolitionists would oppose the war. Conway also said he would support the
continuation of the Confederacy as long as the Confederacy abolished
slavery. Strangely enough, leading
abolitionists had selected Conway to go to England in order to convince the
British that the war was being fought to free the slaves. However, when Conway’s proposal for Southern
independence coupled with abolition was published, most abolitionists reacted
with outrage and withdrew their support from him (Emancipating Slaves,
Enslaving Free Men, p. 206).
To most Southerners, independence was more
important than the continuation of slavery.
This is not surprising, since less than 10 percent of Southern citizens
actually held title to slaves, and since 69-75 percent of Southern families did
not own slaves (John Niven, The Coming
of the Civil War: 1837-1861,
Arlington Heights, Illinois: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 1990, p. 34; Divine et al,
editors, America Past and Present, p. 389; see also the 1860
Census). Early in the war, James
Alcorn, a powerful planter-politician from Mississippi, began to talk openly
about emancipation. Duncan Kenner, one
of the most powerful slaveholders in the South and a chairman in the
Confederate Congress, urged that slavery be abolished. Robert E. Lee, the Confederacy’s most famous
general, believed slavery was evil and favored gradual emancipation. The Confederate secretary of state, Judah
Benjamin, and Governor William Smith of Virginia, also supported ending
slavery. By late 1864, Jefferson Davis
himself was prepared to abolish slavery in order to gain European diplomatic
recognition and thus save the Confederacy, which shows that independence was
more important to him than preserving slavery.
A Confederate soldier who was captured early
in the war expressed the South’s reason for fighting in simple yet eloquent
terms. He wore a ragged homemade
uniform, and like most other Southerners he didn’t own any slaves. When his Union captors asked him why he was
fighting for the Confederacy, he replied, “I’m fighting because you’re down
here” (McPherson, The Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 311, emphasis
added).
What Happened at Andersonville Prison?
The question that really should be asked is,
Why did thousands of Confederate prisoners die of starvation, disease, and
exposure in Northern prison camps when the Union army could have easily given
them adequate food, housing, and medical care?
Yes, thousands of Union prisoners died of
starvation, disease, and exposure at the Confederate prison camp at
Andersonville, but that was because the Confederacy simply didn’t have enough
food, medicine, and facilities to care for them. During this same period, tens of thousands of Confederate
soldiers were going hungry on a regular basis and lacked adequate medical
supplies--because of the Union naval blockade and because of the inhumane
destruction that Union armies were inflicting on the South. Confederate authorities tried to obtain medical supplies for the
Union prisoners at Andersonville, but Lincoln refused to sell them, even though
the Confederates offered to allow Union doctors to accompany the supplies to
ensure they were used for Union prisoners.
After the war, even some Union officers placed the blame for
Andersonville squarely on Lincoln and on Ulysses S. Grant, not on the
Confederacy.
One of the most balanced and objective
treatments of the issue of Andersonville can be found in J. G. Randall and
David Donald’s highly acclaimed book The Civil War and Reconstruction. No one would argue that Randall and Donald
were pro-Confederate historians—in fact, they were decidedly pro-Union in their
outlook. However, on most issues they
were fair and objective, and one of those issues was the Confederate prison
camp at Andersonville. Among other
things, Randall and Donald said,
The Andersonville
prison, until the soldiers built huts for themselves, was but a stockaded
enclosure of sixteen and a half acres in southwestern Georgia. Mosquito-infested tents; myriads of maggots;
pollution and filth due to lack of sanitation; soldiers dying by thousands; men
desperately attempting to tunnel their way to freedom; prison mates turning on
their fellows whom they suspected of treachery or theft; unbaked rations;
inadequate hospital facilities; escaping men hunted down by bloodhounds—such
are the details that come down to us from incontrovertible sources. The causes of such conditions are to be
found in the sheer inability of officers in charge to cope with the immense
number of prisoners pouring in on them before preparations could be made to receive
them, the insurmountable difficulties in obtaining supplies and equipment, and
the poverty of the Confederacy in material resources. Union prisoners at Andersonville were in no worse case than many
of the soldiers of Lee’s army; and it should be remembered that “the prisoners
received the same rations as the soldiers who were guarding them” [quoting
pro-Northern historian James F. Rhodes]. . . . (The Civil War and
Reconstruction, pp. 336-337)
Much could be said about the thousands of Confederate
prisoners who died in Union prison camps and about the horrible conditions in
many of those camps. The Union had no
excuse for not adequately caring for its Confederate prisoners. Unlike the Confederacy, which was literally
starving and was being invaded and blockaded, the Union had more than enough
food, medicine, and equipment. There
was no reason that a single Confederate prisoner should have died of starvation
or exposure. Even Kenneth Davis, who is
very critical of the Confederacy on nearly all issues, admits that thousands of
Confederate prisoners were deliberately mistreated by the Union army:
The worst Union
prison was in Elmira, in upstate New York, where 2,963 Confederate soldiers
died, nearly a quarter of the 12,123 men held there. This death rate was only slightly less than Andersonville’s and
more than double the average death rate in the other Union prison camps. Built in May 1864, after prisoner exchanges
were halted, the camp was designed to hold 5,000 men. The deaths at Elmira were caused by diseases brought on by
starvation and terrible living conditions.
During a bitterly cold winter, clothes sent by families for the
prisoners were deliberately withheld, and hundreds of men, forced to live in
tents with no blankets, froze to death.
In May 1864 War Secretary [Edwin] Stanton ordered prisoner rations
reduced to the same amount issued to Confederate soldiers. This supposedly ensured that Confederate
prisoners were receiving the equivalent of the rations Union prisoners were getting. In other words, in the midst of plenty in
the Union, malnourished Confederate prisoners suffered epidemics of scurvy,
diarrhea, pneumonia, and smallpox. (Don’t Know Much About the Civil War,
p. 354)
Did the South Control the Federal
Government Until 1860?
The claim is frequently made that the South
controlled the federal government until the 1860 election, and that therefore
the South showed a lack of tolerance and fairness when it seceded in response
to Lincoln’s victory. However, anyone
who is familiar with American history knows that the South did not control the
federal government until 1860. Many
Northern politicians and writers trumpeted this myth for political and
propaganda purposes. A major component
of this myth was that the alleged “Slave Power” in the South was behind the
South’s supposed domination of the federal government. Some Northern leaders even claimed there was
a “Slave Power conspiracy” to impose slavery on the entire country. When the war ended, Radical Republicans
issued dire warnings about the need to crush this supposed “Slave Power” in
order to justify their subjugation and looting of the defeated South.
For one thing, wealthy Southern plantation
owners, i.e., the men who allegedly comprised the supposed “Slave Power,” did
not dictate Southern politics.
Moreover, they were by no means uniform in their political beliefs. In fact, many affluent planters were Whigs
(Frank Owsley, Plain Folk of the Old South, LSU Press Edition, LSU
Press, 1982, pp. 141-142; Arthur Schlesinger, The Age of Jackson,
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1945, p. 453; McPherson, The Battle Cry
of Freedom, p. 242). And, as
mentioned earlier, some of the wealthiest slaveholders opposed secession. In Georgia, for example, many counties with
heavy concentrations of Whig slaveholders voted against secession (McPherson, The
Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 242).
Randall and Donald pointed out that the plantation aristocracy did not
control the South’s political destinies:
Nor is it to be
inferred that a plantation “aristocracy” somehow controlled the political
destinies of the region, for the current of democracy had eroded the powers of
the gentry until “whatever influence the planters exercised over the political
action of the common people was of a personal and local nature” [quoting
Owsley, Plain Folk of the Old South, p. 139]. (The Civil War and
Reconstruction, pp. 40-41)
If the South truly “controlled” the federal
government until 1860, one can only wonder why the federal tariff was never as
low as the South wanted it to be, why Congress gave the Northern states a legal
monopoly in the lucrative shipbuilding business and why this monopoly was never
repealed, why it took ten years for Texas to be admitted as a state, why Cuba
was never annexed, how the Missouri Compromise became law in 1820, how the
Tariff of Abominations passed Congress in 1828, how the Force Bill passed
Congress in 1833, how the tariff act of 1842 passed Congress, how the John
Calhoun resolutions of 1847-1848 were all defeated, how the Wilmot Proviso
passed the House of Representatives twice, how the Compromise of 1850 was
enacted, why Kansas wasn’t admitted as a slave state, why the Missouri
Compromise line wasn’t extended to the west coast, and how the draconian
Morrill Tariff passed the House in 1860.
(Some critics claim that Southern congressmen supported the 1828 Tariff
of Abominations, but in point of fact most Southern congressmen voted against
it [Taussig, The Tariff History of the United States, New York: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons, 1910, pp. 61-62].)
It’s true that there were periods when the
South had more influence on federal policy than did the North, but there were
also periods when this was not the case.
At no time did the South “control” the federal government. Cooper notes that “after mid-1854 no chance
remained for a congressional majority on any initiative marked as a southern
measure” (Jefferson Davis, American, p. 284). The South was usually able to block or modify unwanted bills in
the Senate, but not always, and the South was frequently unable to defeat
unwanted bills in the House. As early
as 1819 “the North had built up a decisive majority in the House of
Representatives” (Divine et al, editors, America Past and Present, p.
281).
As for the presidency, Presidents John
Adams, John Quincy Adams, Martin Van Buren, William Harrison, Franklin Pierce,
and James Buchanan were all Northern politicians. And who were the Southern presidents? They were George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison,
James Monroe, Andrew Jackson, John Tyler, James K. Polk, and Zachary
Taylor. So the South by no means
enjoyed exclusive control of the White House prior to the war. Furthermore, the “Southern” presidents
didn’t automatically take the South’s side on all issues, just as the “Northern”
presidents didn’t automatically take the North’s side on all issues. For example, President Taylor sided with
Northern politicians on crucial aspects of the Compromise of 1850 and also
supported the Wilmot Proviso, even
though he himself was a slaveholder.
When the South did exercise considerable
influence on federal policy, it used that influence in efforts to reduce taxes,
to limit the growth of the federal government, to curb or eliminate harmful
protectionist trade policies, to impose fiscal responsibility on federal
spending, to abolish the corrupt United States Bank, to preserve our free
banking system, to prohibit the use of tax dollars for wasteful corporate
welfare schemes, to expand the land area of the United States by acquiring new territory,
to preserve the sovereignty of the states, and to enforce a strict
interpretation of the Constitution.
Under Southern leadership, Texas was finally admitted to the Union and
the gigantic land area of the Mexican Cession became American territory. And if Southern leaders had been able to
persuade the federal government to acquire Cuba, that beautiful island would
have become an American state, there would have been no Cuban Missile Crisis,
and the Cuban people wouldn’t be suffering under Fidel Castro’s oppressive
Marxist regime (which has been in power for over forty years now).
I’m not saying that Southern politicians did
no wrong. For example, the
Southern-inspired 1836-1844 gag rule in the House of Representatives, which
prevented debate on petitions to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia,
was unfortunate, though many Northern congressmen supported the rule as
well. The largely Southern-backed
Lecompton Constitution for Kansas was admittedly unfair, and fortunately the
people of Kansas were eventually able to vote it down. But such cases were the exception, not the
rule. Most of the time Southern
politicians used their influence to pursue good, sound policies that benefited
all citizens.
The Reconstruction Era
Time only allows me to provide a brief
sketch of the “Reconstruction” program that the Republicans imposed on the
South after the war. I don’t deny that
some good things were accomplished during Reconstruction. Nor
do I deny that Reconstruction, as bad as it was, could have been
worse. However, most textbooks only
talk about the good aspects of Reconstruction and either ignore or minimize the
negative aspects. The unjust, illegal
aspects of Reconstruction merit discussion.
Reconstruction began in 1865 and officially
ended in 1877. The Radicals took
substantial control of Reconstruction in 1867.
Reconstruction was bad enough from the outset, but it became much worse
under Radical influence. The Radicals
illegally placed the South under military rule. They divided the South into five military districts, each
governed by a Union army general. They
nullified the recent Southern elections and refused to allow Southern
congressmen to take their seats in Congress, even though these men had been
elected in elections that were just as valid as any election that had been held
in the North. Not content with their
political subjugation of the South, the Radicals and other Republicans allowed
the Southern states to be looted and exploited for years by Northern business
interests and by corrupt Reconstruction governments. The Radicals did these
things over the strenuous objections of Lincoln’s successor, President Andrew
Johnson.
The Radicals also shamelessly contradicted
the earlier Republican claim that the Southern states had not left the
Union. During the war, Lincoln and
other Republicans made the bizarre argument that the Southern states had not
really left the Union but that they had been taken over by “combinations” too
powerful for local authorities to suppress.
According to this pathetic argument, Lincoln wasn’t invading the
Southern states; rather, he was merely liberating them from the “combinations”
that had supposedly seized control of them.
Well, once the war was over, the Radicals decided that the Southern
states had left the Union after all, and that they couldn’t be readmitted until
they complied with Republican demands.
During the worst period of Reconstruction,
Southerners who voiced objections to Republican policy could be jailed, and
even executed, without indictment or trial.
Southern newspapers that criticized Reconstruction ran the real risk of
being shut down, and some newspapers were closed down for this reason. Federal troops were stationed all over the
South, and in many cases their conduct was disgraceful and abusive. Many Republican operatives and other
Northerners who came to the South poisoned race relations by inciting former
slaves to hate and persecute Southern whites.
The Republicans made it illegal for males who had served in the
Confederate army or in the Confederate government to vote or hold public
office. Ex-Confederates could only vote
if they were willing to lie by taking the “ironclad oath.” The oath disqualified any man who had served
in the Confederacy or who had even “aided” the Confederacy. Of course, this excluded a large majority of
Southern men. To their credit, some
Southern black leaders opposed denying former Confederates the right to vote,
but their efforts were unsuccessful.
New Southern legislatures and governors were chosen in elections in
which most former Confederates were barred from voting. These corrupt Reconstruction state
governments imposed oppressive taxes on their citizens and also stole or wasted
a staggering amount of taxpayer money.
Hummel notes the heavy tax burden that was
imposed on the South after the war:
. . . the
war-ravaged South suffered under some of the heaviest state and local taxation
in proportion to wealth in U.S. history.
Tax rates in 1870 were three or four times what they had been in 1860,
even though property values had declined significantly. Many who had not lost their land already
were now forced into bankruptcy. At one
point 15 percent of all taxable land in Mississippi was up for sale because of
tax defaults. (Emancipating Slaves, Enslaving Free Men, p. 316)
Northern business interests took full
advantage of the South’s subjugation during Reconstruction. African-American scholars Franklin and Moss
note that “Northern financiers and industrialists took advantage of the opportunity
to impose their economic control on the South, and much of it endured for
generations” (From Slavery to Freedom: A History of African Americans,
p. 264). Kenneth Davis concedes that
Southern railroad companies were "burdened for decades by unfair rates and
restrictive tariffs set by Northerners, who controlled the vast majority of
railways and the legislatures that set rates" (Don't Know Much About
the Civil War, pp. 425-426).
“But,” some will ask, “wasn’t slavery
abolished under Reconstruction?” Yes,
slavery was abolished during the Johnson phase of Reconstruction when the
Thirteenth Amendment was ratified on December 18, 1865. We can all agree that slavery was wrong and
that it needed to be abolished. But it
was abolished in a way that was unfair and that caused enormous damage to the
Southern economy. Under the Thirteenth
Amendment, Southern slaveholders received no compensation for their
slaves. The abolition of slavery
without compensation cost the South about two billion dollars in capital, and
it reduced real estate values by at least that amount. In terms of modern monetary value, this
represented a total loss of over sixty billion dollars.
Southern slaveholders should have been able
to recover the cost of their slaves, just as Northern slaveholders had been
able to do decades earlier. Most
Southern slaveholders treated their slaves humanely. Many of these men believed they had a Christian duty to properly
and respectfully care for their slaves.
One doesn’t have to condone human bondage to acknowledge that in most
cases Southern slavery was administered humanely. This isn’t the place for an extended discussion on slavery in the
pre-war South, but it should be
pointed out that Southern slaves had a life expectancy that was comparable
to urban populations and higher than in Europe, that 66-80 percent of
slave marriages were not broken up, that nearly 40 percent of the
marriages performed in Southern Episcopal churches between 1800 and 1860 were
slave marriages, that even in the 1850s many slaves were able to buy their
freedom because they were permitted to earn money, and that hundreds of
thousands of slaves were converted to Christianity. Granted, no matter how humanely slavery was administered, it was
still wrong. The point is that most
Southern slaveholders did not deserve to lose their slaves without
compensation, and that this unfair policy did great damage to the South’s
economy.
Textbooks note the fact that Radical
Reconstruction included civil rights reforms that enabled former slaves to
vote. However, they almost never
mention information that sheds important light on those reforms. If the Republicans had enacted and
implemented these reforms in a legal, ethical manner, and if their motives for
doing so had been noble, they would deserve nothing but praise. But such was not the case. Most Republican leaders supported the
imposition of these reforms because they wanted to control and exploit the
Southern states, not because they really cared about the fate of the ex-slaves. Republican operatives manipulated, and
sometimes even coerced, ex-slaves to vote Republican so the Republican Party
could take over Southern state governments.
Once the Republicans achieved this goal, they proceeded to engage in
large-scale corruption and oppression, which harmed blacks and whites
alike. A respected moderate Southern
leader in Mississippi warned President Johnson that the Republican-created
Freedmen’s Bureau was “demoralizing the negroes, robbing and defrauding them”
(Felicity Allen, Jefferson Davis: Unconquerable Heart, Columbia,
Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1999, p. 472).
Civil rights could and should have been
advanced through legal, ethical means.
Yes, this would have taken longer, but it would have preserved the constitutional
republic that our founding fathers gave us, and all Americans would have been
better off in the long run. Instead, in
the name of imposing civil rights on the South, the Republicans, led by the
Radicals, subverted the rule of law, permitted Republican operatives to engage
in astonishing corruption, looted the South for years, poisoned race relations,
illegally and unethically amended the Constitution, further destroyed the
balance of power between the states and the federal government, and empowered
the federal government to perform functions that the founding fathers did not
want it to perform.
I would like to conclude this discussion on
Reconstruction by quoting a substantial portion of President Johnson’s veto of
the first Radical Reconstruction Act.
Before doing so, I should point out that the Radicals tried to remove
Johnson from office because he opposed their Reconstruction program, even
though he had staunchly supported the war and had opposed secession. When Lincoln was assassinated, some Radicals
said Lincoln’s death was “a godsend to the country” because they believed
Johnson, unlike Lincoln, would help them ravage the South. When the Radicals realized Johnson was not
going to cooperate with them, they turned on him with a vengeance. They impeached (i.e., indicted) him in the
House and then put him on trial in the Senate, on the basis of utterly
frivolous charges (Johnson was acquitted).
Amazingly, a few Radicals even tried to frame Johnson for Lincoln’s
murder. In any case, the Radicals
overturned Johnson’s veto. Therefore,
their Reconstruction program became law and was imposed on ten of the eleven
Southern states (the one exception was Tennessee). Here is some of what President Johnson had to say about the first
Reconstruction Act and why he refused to sign it:
I have examined the
bill "to provide for the more efficient government of the rebel
States" with the care and the anxiety which its transcendent importance is
calculated to awaken. I am unable to give it my assent for reasons so grave
that I hope a statement of them may have some influence on the minds of the
patriotic and enlightened men with whom the decision must ultimately rest. The bill places all the people of the ten
States therein named under the absolute domination of military rulers. . . .
The bill . . .
would seem to show upon its face that the establishment of peace and good order
is not its real object. The fifth section declares that the preceding sections
shall cease to operate in any State where certain events shall have happened. .
. . All these conditions must be
fulfilled before the people of any of these States can be relieved from the
bondage of military domination; but when they are fulfilled, then immediately
the pains and penalties of the bill are to cease, no matter whether there be
peace and order or not, and without any reference to the security of life or
property. The excuse given for the bill in the preamble is admitted by the bill
itself not to be real. The military rule which it establishes is plainly to be
used, not for any purpose of order or for the prevention of crime, but solely
as a means of coercing the people into the adoption of principles and measures
to which it is known that they are opposed, and upon which they have an
undeniable right to exercise their own judgment. . . .
I submit to
Congress whether this measure is not in its whole character, scope, and object
without precedent and without authority, in palpable conflict with the plainest
provisions of the Constitution, and utterly destructive to those great
principles of liberty and humanity for which our ancestors on both sides of the
Atlantic have shed so much blood and expended so much treasure. . . . (Veto of
the first Reconstruction Act, March 2, 1867)
The True Nature of the War
In reality, the Civil War was not a civil
war. In a civil war, two or more
factions fight for control of the national government. But the South was not trying to overthrow the
national government, nor was it trying to achieve exclusive control of the
government. The South merely wanted to
leave the federal government in peace and was willing to pay its share of the
national debt and to pay compensation for federal installations in the Southern
states. The Confederacy tried to
establish peaceful relations with the federal government, but Lincoln refused
to even meet with Confederate representatives.
The Civil War was a war of aggression
against the South. Republican leaders
and their Northern industrialist backers used the force of the federal government
to destroy Southern independence. Some
of these men despised the South.
Radical Republicans saw in secession an excuse to subjugate and exploit
the Southern states. Northern business
leaders who bankrolled the Republicans feared that their financial empire would
be threatened if the Confederate states were able to trade directly with other
nations with the much lower Confederate tariff. The Republicans weren’t about to lower the tariff, since they
were committed to drastically raising it (which they did soon after the South
seceded). Rather than fairly compete
with the low Confederate tariff by lowering the federal tariff, the Republicans
and their Northern financial backers opted to destroy the Confederacy by
force. Charles Adams demonstrates that
after the Confederacy announced its low tariff, influential Northern business
interests began to strongly oppose peaceful separation and Lincoln’s cabinet
quickly reversed itself and adopted a hardline stance on Fort Sumter (When
In the Course of Human Events: Arguing the Case for Southern Secession,
Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2000, pp. 26-27, pp.
61-70). Simkins said the following
about the motives behind the federal invasion, race relations in the North, and
what happened when Southern influence was removed from the federal government:
Northern industrial
and financial leaders wished to destroy the influence of the agrarian South in
Washington in order to use the powers of the federal government to their own
advantage. Northern common people
wished slavery restricted or abolished because they objected to the competition
of cheap labor, not because they wished to make the bondsmen their equals. Both of these groups revealed their intentions
when Southern influence was removed from the federal capital and when the Negro
was free. The business leaders imposed
high tariffs, constitutional protection to corporations, monetary deflation,
and centralized banking. The common
people denied the free Negro access to Western lands [the western territories]
and imposed upon him caste restrictions in some respects sharper than those of
the South. “It is not humanity,” said
Jefferson Davis to the North in 1861, “that influences you in the position that
you now occupy before the country. . . .
It is that you may have a majority in the Congress of the United States
and convert the government into an engine of Northern aggrandizement. It is that your section may grow in power
and prosperity upon treasures unjustly taken from the South.” (A History of
the South, p. 190)
Most Republican leaders, while claiming they
were “saving” the Union and preserving representative government, were
undemocratic and despotic. The worst
offenders were the Radical Republicans, but other Republicans were almost as
bad. The Republicans and their generals
imprisoned thousands of Northern citizens in order to suppress Northern
opposition to the war. They shut down
hundreds of Northern newspapers and jailed dozens of newspaper editors for
expressing “unpatriotic” views. They
suspended the writ of habeas corpus (protection against unlawful arrest),
rigged elections, prevented two Northern legislatures from convening, and
branded as “traitors” Northern political opponents who spoke out against
Republican violations of civil rights.
In one case, they arrested thirty-one members of the Maryland
legislature and sealed off the town where the legislature was meeting. When it became known that former president
Franklin Pierce believed the war was cruel and unnecessary, Republicans accused
him of treason and nearly had him arrested.
(Pierce feared the true purpose of the war was to wipe out the states as
sovereign entities and to drastically increase the power of the federal government
in violation of the Constitution. Pierce
also believed it was wrong to hold the Union together by force.)
The Republicans and their generals waged a
shameful form of “total war” against the South, causing the deaths of some
50,000 Southern civilians and wiping out whole towns in the process. They hired thousands of unscrupulous
mercenaries, including many criminals fresh from European jails. They violated just about every rule of
civilized warfare known to man. They
used tactics that today would justify prosecution for war crimes. A few Union generals, including George
McClellan, objected to this cruel form of warfare, and at least one general,
Don C. Buell, resigned from the army in protest--but these men were the
exception, not the rule. On the other
hand, the vast majority of Confederate generals refused to use the brutal
tactics that so many Union generals were using. At one point, some Confederate officials urged Jefferson Davis to
order Confederate forces to employ the barbaric tactics that were being used by
Union generals like William Tecumseh Sherman and Phil Sheridan, but Davis
refused. If the South had won, several
Union generals could have been tried and hung for war crimes. Most Republican leaders, including Lincoln,
strongly backed those generals. (A
sobering collection of Union war atrocities is presented in Thomas Bland Keys’
book The Uncivil War: Union Army and Navy Excesses in the Official Records,
Biloxi, Mississippi: The Beauvoir Press, 1991, which is based almost
exclusively on Union army records.)
After the war, most Republicans in Congress
continued to violate the Constitution.
They imposed a clearly illegal military rule on the Southern states and
proceeded to plunder those states for years.
The Radicals and their supporters in the Union army accused and jailed Jefferson
Davis on the absurd charge that he was involved in the conspiracy that killed
Lincoln. They based this charge on
evidence that was later found to be fraudulent. They tried to remove President Johnson from office for opposing
their illegal plans to ravage the South and for daring to defy their attempt to
prevent him from replacing Edwin Stanton as secretary of war. Can you imagine the outcry that would arise
today if Congress tried to force the president to retain a cabinet member
against his will?
The Radicals came close to establishing a
military dictatorship in the name of “reconstructing” the defeated Southern
states. The Radicals passed a bill that
said the military didn’t have to obey the president’s orders unless the
commanding general of the Army approved those orders (McDonald, States’
Rights and the Union, p. 213). The
bill also made it a crime for any officer to obey orders except those that came
from the commanding general (Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens, p. 298).
Just imagine what most Americans today would
think if the secretary of defense refused to step down when suspended by the
president but instead barricaded himself in his office, issued an order for the
arrest of the man appointed to replace him, and asked friendly members of Congress
to intervene. And imagine what most
Americans would think if the commanding general of the Army then stationed
troops around the Pentagon in order to keep the secretary of defense in power
against the president’s express wishes.
Impossible? Couldn’t happen in
America? Well, that’s exactly what
happened when President Johnson tried to replace Stanton as secretary of
war. When Johnson appointed Lorenzo
Thomas to replace Stanton, Stanton barricaded himself in his office, issued an
order for Thomas’s arrest, and asked his fellow Radicals to help him remain in
power. General Ulysses S. Grant then
stationed troops around the War Department building and authorized them to call
for reinforcements if necessary, causing fears that “a new civil war was about
to erupt in the capital” (Elizabeth D. Leonard (Lincoln’s Avengers: Justice,
Revenge, and Reunion after the Civil War, New York: W. W. Norton &
Company, 2004, p. 279).
There were other Radical abuses. In January 1868, the Radicals and most of
their fellow Republicans passed a bill, over Johnson’s veto, that transferred
all of Johnson’s authority in Reconstruction to General Grant. The Radicals also worked to deny President
Johnson his constitutional authority to appoint justices to the Supreme Court by amending the Judiciary Act so
the president couldn’t fill vacancies that might occur on the high court
(McDonald, States’ Rights and the Union, p. 211). After Edwin Stanton barricaded himself in
his office and asked the Radicals for help, two Radicals, Senator Zachary
Chandler and Representative John Logan, personally led a company of one hundred
men to guard the War Department building (Brodie, Thaddeus Stevens, p.
335).
When even the Lincoln-packed Supreme Court
tried to curb Republican lawlessness, the Radicals reacted with outrage. In the Ex Parte Milligan case, the
high court finally gathered enough courage to conclude that it was illegal to
impose military rule on civilians in non-combat areas where civil courts were
still in operation (which was what the Republicans had been doing, in the
North, for much of the war). The
Radicals were furious with this ruling, partly because it implied they had
committed judicial murder, since several civilians had been sentenced to death
by federal military courts. Then, in Ex
Parte McCardle, the Supreme Court upheld the right of habeas corpus and
reaffirmed the principle that civilians couldn’t be tried in military courts
when civil courts were available. The
Radicals were so angered by this decision that they introduced bills in
Congress that would have (1) abolished the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in all
habeas corpus cases, (2) ended all judicial review of acts of Congress, and (3)
prohibited the high court from reviewing cases that involved “political questions,”
including the Reconstruction Act. This
was an open attack on basic American concepts of government, justice, and due
process. For example, if the Supreme
Court were denied jurisdiction in habeas corpus cases, it would be unable to
protect citizens against unlawful arrest and imprisonment. That was exactly what the Radicals
wanted. Luckily, the bills were
defeated. “Had they been enacted,”
notes McDonald, “the Court would have been destroyed as an arbiter of the
Constitution” (States’ Rights and the Union, p. 218).
I’m not arguing that all the Radicals were
corrupt or that everything they believed was wrong. Although I share the view that many of the Radicals were more
interested in power than in civil rights, I also believe that some of them were
sincere. The Radicals deserve credit
for eventually forcing Lincoln to provide equal pay for black Union soldiers
during the war and for trying to provide food, clothing, and income for former
slaves after the war. For the most
part, the Radicals’ positions on civil rights issues were commendable,
enlightened, and moral. However, in
many cases the Radicals used ruthless, illegal, and unethical methods to
achieve their civil rights objectives, and some of their other objectives were
dishonorable.
In a very real sense, the
Civil War was not North vs. South; rather, it was hardline Republican leaders
and certain Northern business interests vs. the rest of the country. Although the vast majority of Southerners
supported the Confederacy, at least 40 percent of Northerners did not support
the Republicans and wanted to halt or even abandon the federal invasion of the
South. Before the war, dozens of
Northern newspapers voiced the view that the South should be allowed to depart
in peace. During the war, so many
Northern citizens opposed Lincoln’s policies that the Republicans had to impose
military rule on large areas of the North.
A good indication of
Lincoln’s significant lack of Northern support can be seen in the results of
the 1864 presidential election.
Amazingly, Lincoln’s opponent in that election, former Union general
George McClellan, received 41 percent of the vote, even though by then a
Northern victory seemed likely, even though the Republicans engaged in questionable
polling-place tactics in certain areas, and even though the Republicans had
muzzled criticism of the war in much of the Northern press.
At just about any point in the war, it’s probable that a majority of Americans opposed the use of force to hold the Union together. If Southern citizens had voted even in the 1864 election, McClellan may very well have received a majority of the popular vote, especially if the election had been conducted fairly. If the election had been held in 1862 and had included Southern citizens, Lincoln almost certainly would have lost the popular vote in a landslide. If Northern citizens had known in advance what Lincoln was going to do in response to secession, it’s unlikely that he would have been elected in the first place. It should be remembered that when Lincoln won the 1860 election, he only received 39.9 percent of the popular vote. The conservative vote was split between three candidates, Stephen Douglas, John Breckinridge, and John Bell, each of whom, incidentally, later voiced opposition to using force to maintain the Union. Lincoln received about 1.9 million votes, while Douglas, Breckinridge, and Bell received about 2.8 million votes. However, Lincoln won the election because 122 of the 152 Electoral College votes that he needed for victory were concentrated in just six Northern states.
One of the many untold stories of the Civil
War is the fact that Indians, Hispanics, and African Americans supported and
even fought for the Confederacy. The
five tribes of the Indian Territory supported the Confederacy and contributed
troops to the Confederate army. One
Confederate general was a Cherokee Indian and was one of the last flag officers
to surrender his troops at the end of the war.
Thousands of Hispanics served as soldiers in
the Confederate army, and some even served as commissioned officers. In his book Hispanic Confederates (Clearfield Company, 1999),
John O’Donnell-Rosales identifies 3,600 Hispanic Confederate soldiers by name
and unit. The Confederate commissioner
to northern Mexico was a Cuban named José Agustín Quintero. Hispanic American Santos Benavides commanded
the Confederate 33rd Texas Cavalry, the Mexican-American unit that defeated
Union forces in the 1864 Battle of Laredo.
Santiago Vidaurri, the governor of the Mexican border states of Coahuila
and Nuevo León, offered to have northern Mexico secede and join the
Confederacy, but Jefferson Davis declined the offer because he was afraid
Lincoln would then blockade Mexican ports.
There is evidence that thousands of African
Americans fought for the Confederacy.
For example, the chief inspector of the U.S. Sanitary Commission, Dr.
Lewis Steiner, reported that he saw about 3,000 well-armed black Confederate
soldiers in Stonewall Jackson’s army and that those soldiers were
"manifestly an integral portion of the Southern Confederate
Army." In a Union army battle
report, a “General D. Stuart” complained about the deadly effectiveness of the
black Confederate soldiers whom his troops had encountered. Confederate general Nathan Bedford Forrest
had slaves and free blacks serving in units under his command, and said of
them, “These boys stayed with me . . . and better Confederates did not
live.” After the Battle of Gettysburg,
Union forces took seven black Confederate soldiers as prisoners, as was noted
in a Northern newspaper at the time, which said, “. . . reported among the
rebel prisoners were seven blacks in Confederate uniforms fully armed as
soldiers.” None other than African-American
abolitionist Frederick Douglass complained that there were “many” blacks in the
Confederate army who were armed and “ready to shoot down” Union soldiers. During the Battle of
Chickamauga, slaves serving Confederate soldiers armed themselves and asked
permission to join the fight—and when they received that permission they fought
commendably. Their commander, Captain
J. B. Briggs, later noted that these men “filled a portion of the line of
advance as well as any company of the regiment.” There are numerous accounts of slaves assisting Confederate
soldiers in battle and helping them to escape capture afterward (see, for
example, Francis Springer, War for What?, Springfield, Tennessee:
Nippert Publishing Company, 1990, pp. 172-183). Two weeks after the Fort Sumter incident, several companies of
black Confederate volunteer soldiers passed through Augusta, Georgia, on their
way to Virginia (J. H. Segars and Charles Kelly Barrow, editors, Black
Southerners in Confederate Armies: A Collection of Historical Accounts,
Atlanta, Georgia: Southern Lion Books, 2001, pp. 3-4). After the war, hundreds of African Americans
received Confederate veterans’ pensions.
Photos of reunions of Confederate veterans show African Americans in
attendance. As strange as it may seem
to most people in our day, many Southern slaves and free blacks felt loyalty to
the South and viewed Union troops as invaders.
Another untold story of the Civil War is the
brutal way that many Union forces treated Southern slaves. One Union unit, commanded by Colonel John
Turchin, moved into Athens, Georgia, and, with Turchin’s approval, spent weeks
in the slave huts “debauching the females.”
Turchin’s superior officers court-martialed and convicted him for his
crimes. (Amazingly, Lincoln later
promoted Turchin to brigadier general.)
In another case, a Union colonel, Ignatz Kappner, reported that Union
troops “broke en masse in the camps of the colored women and are committing all
sorts of outrage.” In some cases, Union
soldiers would torture and even kill slaves who would not reveal the location
of their masters’ valuables. Union
soldiers usually viewed captured or runaway slaves as “contrabands” and often
mistreated them. Says McPherson,
While northern
soldiers had no love for slavery, most of them had no love for slaves either. .
. . While some Yanks treated contrabands with a degree of equity and
benevolence, the more typical response was indifference, contempt, and
cruelty. Soon after Union forces captured Port Royal, South Carolina, in
November 1861, a private described an incident there that made him “ashamed of
America”: “About 8-10 soldiers from the New York 47th chased some Negro women
but they escaped, so they took a Negro girl about 7-9 years old, and raped
her.” From Virginia a Connecticut
soldier wrote that some men of his regiment had taken “two Nigger wenches
[women] . . . turned them upon their heads, and put tobacco, chips, sticks,
lighted cigars and sand into their behinds.”
Even when Billy Yank welcomed the contrabands, he often did so from
utilitarian rather than humanitarian motives.
“Officers and men are having an easy time,” wrote a Maine soldier from
occupied Louisiana in 1862. “We have Negroes to do all fatigue work, cooking
and washing clothes." (The Battle Cry of Freedom, p. 497, emphasis
added)
The case of the Union army’s treatment of the
slaves in Bisland, Louisiana, is another example of federal mistreatment of
Southern slaves. When Union forces
occupied the area around Bisland, they caused the deaths of numerous slaves and
left hundreds of others in terrible condition.
When Confederate forces recaptured the area, they found shallow graves
where slaves had been hastily buried.
They found a local sugar house filled with dead and dying slaves. In one location the roads were lined with
slaves who were half-starved, sick, and unable to care for themselves. Upon seeing the plight of the Bisland
slaves, the Confederate troops provided them with food, medicine, and
transportation, saving hundreds of them from certain death (James and Walter
Kennedy, The South Was Right!, Second Edition, Gretna, Louisiana:
Pelican Publishing Company, 1994, pp. 143-144; David Edmonds, editor, The
Conduct of Federal Troops in Louisiana, Lafayette, Louisiana: The Acadiana
Press, 1988, pp. 116-119).
Textbooks note that well over 100,000 slaves
served in the Union army, but they rarely inform the reader that thousands of
those men were forced to serve. Union
army records and other sources document that thousands of slaves were abducted
and then forced into military service; some were taken from their plantations
during Union raids, while others were seized in areas that were occupied by
federal forces. General John Logan told
General Grant, “A major of colored troops is here capturing negroes, with or
without their consent.” General Lovell
Rousseau informed General G. H. Thomas that “officers in command of colored
troops are in constant habit of pressing [i.e., forcing] all able-bodied slaves
into the military service of the U.S.”
Even in the Union slave state of Kentucky, federal gunboats raided
plantations, “carrying off slaves to help build military railroads,
fortifications, and wagon roads” (Klingaman, Abraham Lincoln and the Road to
Emancipation, p. 161). In May 1862,
federal troops in South Carolina forcefully rounded up hundreds of slaves in
compliance with General David Hunter’s order to raise two regiments of black
troops from slaves (or “contrabands”) in his region.
The conscription of slaves by federal forces continued
even after the Emancipation Proclamation was signed. For example, several months after the proclamation was issued,
General Innis Palmer wanted to provide “laborers” for federal troops at Fort
Monroe. He informed his superior on
September 1, 1864, that even though he was having trouble “collecting the
colored men” for this purpose, he had already sent 221 of them and was
expecting to get “a large lot” the next day, adding that “. . . the negroes
will not go voluntarily, so I am obliged to force them” (Keys, The Uncivil
War, p. 106).
Southern family journals and letters contain
numerous accounts of Union soldiers forcefully removing slaves from their
homes, even when the slaves made it clear they didn’t want to leave (see, for
example, Henry Steele Commager, editor, The
Civil War Archive: The History of the Civil War in Documents, New York:
Black Dog and Leventhal Publishers, 2000, pp. 333-336, 675-677).
I’m not suggesting that all slaves remained
loyal to their masters or to the South during the war. Many thousands of Southern slaves did in
fact flock to Union lines, just as thousands of colonial slaves flocked to
British lines during the Revolutionary War.
But many Southern slaves remained loyal, and quite of few of them viewed
Union troops as invaders.
What If the South Had Been Allowed to Go
in Peace?
Did the world end when America became a
separate country from England? No, and
not only have America and England long been staunch allies and close trading
partners, but their peoples continue to share many friendships and family
relationships. Norway seceded from
Sweden, without a war, and the two countries still enjoy friendly
relations. Although I don’t advocate
modern secession, and although I’m proud of the many good things that America has
done, I don’t think it would have been the end of the world if the South had
been allowed to go in peace.
I think both the U.S.A. and the C.S.A. would
have flourished. Interchange between
the states of the two nations would have continued almost exactly as
before. If anything, the presence of a
prosperous low-tax, limited-government Southern confederacy would have been a
powerful incentive for the federal government to limit taxes and to adhere more
closely to the limitations imposed on it by the Constitution.
Some critics have suggested that if the
Confederacy had survived, World War II may have had a different outcome. But the fact that England and America
separated didn’t prevent them from later joining forces to defeat Nazi Germany
and Imperial Japan in World War II. The
U.S. and the Confederacy certainly would have teamed up to do the same thing.
If the South had been permitted to go in
peace, slavery would have died a natural death in a matter of a few decades, if
not sooner. Before the war, even some
Northern politicians, such as William Seward, said slavery was a dying
institution. The percentage of Southern
whites that belonged to slaveholding families dropped by 5 percent from
1850-1860 (Divine et al, editor, America Past and Present, p. 389). Historian Allan Nevins noted that by the
1850s "slavery was dying all around the edges of its domain" (The
Emergence of Lincoln, Volume 2, p. 469).
Although slavery was still economically profitable, its days were
numbered. Interestingly, some of the
most vocal Northern abolitionists, including Wendell Phillips, welcomed the
South’s secession because they believed Southern slavery would die out more
quickly if the South were no longer part of the Union.
If the South had been allowed to leave in
peace, over 600,000 soldiers (over half of them from the North) would have been
spared death. Over 50,000 Southern
civilians likewise would have been spared death. Hundreds of thousands of soldiers would not have been wounded for
life. Millions of families would have
been spared sorrow and anguish over their dead and wounded loved ones. Billions of dollars in property damage would
have been avoided. And, race relations
would not have suffered the poisoning that they experienced during and after
the war.
“But,” some will ask, “wouldn’t the Union
have been destroyed if the Confederacy had survived?” This was one of Lincoln’s erroneous arguments. The Union would not have been “destroyed” if
the South had been allowed to leave in peace.
The Union still would have had 23 states, compared to the Confederacy’s
11 states, and it would have retained control over the vast western
territories. The Union’s population was
more than twice the size of the Confederacy’s.
In addition, the Union had nine times more factories than the
Confederacy, twenty times more pig iron, seventeen times more textiles, two and
a half times more railroad tracks, thirty-two times more firearms, and nine
times more production value. The Union
still would have been one of the largest and most powerful countries on the
earth even without the eleven states of the Confederacy. So the Union would have been just fine if
the Republicans had allowed the South to go in peace. (Of course, if the two nations had lived in peace, the Union
would have needed to lower its tariff in order to compete with the low
Confederate tariff, but that could have been done in a matter of days by the
U.S. Congress.)
What would the South be like today if the
Confederacy had survived? No one can
say with certainty, but it’s likely
that taxes of all kinds would be much lower.
Citizens would have much less government interference in their
lives. Parents would have more control
over their children’s education and over their local schools. Southern schools would most likely allow
voluntary prayer, moral instruction, nativity plays at Christmas time, and
formal Bible reading (as our schools used to do until the 1960s when the
Supreme Court suddenly decided these things were somehow “unconstitutional”). There would be tough anti-pornography
laws. The lives of unborn children
would be protected by law. There would
be no question that marriage should be reserved for a man and a woman. And a state government could place a Ten
Commandments monument in front of a state judicial building without having to
worry about a federal judge wrongfully ordering its removal.
However, all this being said, I think that
if the South had been allowed to go in peace, it would have eventually rejoined
the Union. But, if not, I don’t think
it would have been the end of the world if the South had remained
independent. England and America have
managed to do very well as separate nations.
So have Norway and Sweden. I
think the Confederacy and the United States could have done the same thing.
Final Thoughts
Some people think it is unpatriotic or divisive
to defend the Southern side of the Civil War.
As a retired U.S. Army veteran and a flag-waving patriot, I reject that
view. Confederate citizens were Americans
too. They were citizens of the
“Confederate States of America.”
Their heroes included George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, Patrick
Henry, George Mason, Davy Crockett, and Andrew Jackson. The official Confederate seal featured the
image of George Washington on his horse.
The Confederate president, Jefferson Davis, was a former U.S. Army
officer, a genuine hero in the Mexican War, an outstanding U.S. secretary of
war, and a highly respected member of the U.S. Senate. Dozens of other Confederate officials had
likewise served faithfully in the U.S. government. One of the members of the Confederate Congress was former U.S.
president John Tyler.
It is time for the demonization and smearing of
the Confederacy to stop. Compared with
other nations of its day, the Confederacy was one of the most democratic
countries in the world. Even during the
war, the Confederacy held elections and had a vibrant free press. In fact, on balance, the Confederacy was
more democratic than some nations in our day.
Confederate citizens enjoyed every right that we now enjoy, if not
more. The Confederacy sought peace with
the federal government and only fought because it was invaded. The Confederate Constitution was patterned
after the U.S. Constitution and contained improvements that even some Northern
commentators acknowledged were praiseworthy.
Yes, the Confederacy permitted slavery, but it
left the door open for the admission of free states and for the abolition of
slavery at the state level. Let’s keep in
mind, too, that the American colonies permitted slavery for decades, that the
United States permitted slavery for over half a century, that several Northern
states made huge fortunes from the slave trade, and that many of our founding
fathers were slaveholders, including George Washington, Thomas Jefferson,
Patrick Henry, James Madison, John Rutledge, George Mason, and Benjamin
Franklin. Let’s also keep in mind that
most Confederate citizens did not own slaves, and that by 1864 key Confederate
leaders were prepared to abolish slavery.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Michael T. Griffith holds a Bachelor of Science degree from Excelsior College in Albany, New York, two Associate in Applied Science degrees from the Community College of the Air Force, and an Advanced Certificate of Civil War Studies and a Certificate of Civil War Studies from Carroll College in Wisconsin. He is a two-time graduate of the Defense Language Institute in Monterey, California, in Arabic and Hebrew, and of the U.S. Air Force Technical Training School in San Angelo, Texas. He is the author of four books on Mormonism and ancient texts, and of one book on the John F. Kennedy assassination. He has completed advanced Hebrew programs at Haifa University in Israel and at the Spiro Institute in London, England. He is currently pursuing a Master's degree in Religious Studies from The Catholic Distance University in Hamilton, Virginia.